truth about RTAS! - GSM-Forum

ndagi · 07-22-2012, 09:50

excerpt taken from what seems to be a write up by a RIM staff! in my bid to make some sense of all this nonsense i combed the internet and found this on the *********(serious minded guys over there by the way) and copied it . This should shed some light on the bricked newer BBs no one can obviously revive!

How RTAS works

The RTAS solution works by allowing the device (which only runs trusted code) to

authenticate against a trusted server within RIM before allowing any tools to connect.

This authentication process is based around a challenge-response system that makes use

of RSA asymmetric cryptography. The challenge issued by the device uses an encrypted

session key which can only be decrypted by the private key hidden in RTAS. The RTAS

server is secured, operated and controlled on-site at RIM. Any user wishing to use a

secured tool must login to the RTAS server, authenticate, and receive the decrypted

session key before access will be granted for any tool, on a per-use basis. Thus we take

the control away from the hostile PC environment and remove the security risk.

A connection to RTAS can only be established within RIMNET confines. To allow

carriers and other business partners to run limited commands and even provide RMA

services on devices at store fronts, web-based tools running on a DMZ will be

provisioned. This gives us huge potential to provide powerful tools to

selected business partners without the risks and concerns we had previously.

Insecure
devices do not normally have RTAS challenges enabled (though they can be

manually enabled through
bugdisp). Collecting logs with bugdump, bugsimple or

wbugdisp
does not require access to RTAS. RTAS is only required to decrypt the logs.

After decrypting the log in
wbugdisp, saving the log to disk will by default save a

decrypted version of the log. The RTAS challenge can also be disabled on a per device

basis to allow for offline development and testing.

balgecello · 07-22-2012, 14:17

pertamax..............

<::GSM PunJabi::> · 07-23-2012, 02:42

Old News bro! This has been already leaked 2 years ago!!

yogyaphone. · 07-23-2012, 03:16

Quote:

Originally Posted by arandhawa23

Old News bro! This has been already leaked 2 years ago!!

Still,
a useful info for those who didn't noticed. Please appreciate

BR

07-22-2012, 09:50	#1 (permalink)
ndagi No Life Poster Join Date: Dec 2002 Location: nigeria Posts: 619 Member: 18926 Status: Offline Sonork: ndagi Thanks: 116 Thanked 49 Times in 36 Posts	truth about RTAS! excerpt taken from what seems to be a write up by a RIM staff! in my bid to make some sense of all this nonsense i combed the internet and found this on the *********(serious minded guys over there by the way) and copied it . This should shed some light on the bricked newer BBs no one can obviously revive! How RTAS works The RTAS solution works by allowing the device (which only runs trusted code) to authenticate against a trusted server within RIM before allowing any tools to connect. This authentication process is based around a challenge-response system that makes use of RSA asymmetric cryptography. The challenge issued by the device uses an encrypted session key which can only be decrypted by the private key hidden in RTAS. The RTAS server is secured, operated and controlled on-site at RIM. Any user wishing to use a secured tool must login to the RTAS server, authenticate, and receive the decrypted session key before access will be granted for any tool, on a per-use basis. Thus we take the control away from the hostile PC environment and remove the security risk. A connection to RTAS can only be established within RIMNET confines. To allow carriers and other business partners to run limited commands and even provide RMA services on devices at store fronts, web-based tools running on a DMZ will be provisioned. This gives us huge potential to provide powerful tools to selected business partners without the risks and concerns we had previously. Insecure devices do not normally have RTAS challenges enabled (though they can be manually enabled through bugdisp). Collecting logs with bugdump, bugsimple or wbugdisp does not require access to RTAS. RTAS is only required to decrypt the logs. After decrypting the log in wbugdisp, saving the log to disk will by default save a decrypted version of the log. The RTAS challenge can also be disabled on a per device basis to allow for offline development and testing.

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07-22-2012, 14:17	#2 (permalink)
balgecello Major Poster Join Date: Aug 2010 Location: dmna aja BOLE Posts: 46 Member: 1370428 Status: Offline Sonork: balgecello Thanks: 22 Thanked 20 Times in 9 Posts	pertamax..............

07-23-2012, 02:42	#3 (permalink)
<::GSM PunJabi::> Freak Poster Join Date: Sep 2011 Location: Hacking in Motion (HIM) Posts: 331 Member: 1664146 Status: Offline Sonork: 100.1611754 Thanks: 5 Thanked 79 Times in 39 Posts	Old News bro! This has been already leaked 2 years ago!!